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Abstract
This article presents the results of the first ex-post sustainability study among 93 
development interventions implemented between 1990 and 2008 in Kenya, India, 
South Africa, and Ghana. The interventions were undertaken by 42 different local 
organisations with support from an equal number of Dutch small-scale, voluntary 
development organisations. We find that a large number of interventions still achieve 
the intended output and outcome results. The results show no differences between 
interventions that took place 5, 10, or 15 years before the study. Financial depend-
ency on the Dutch partner organisations remains large. The levels of sustainability 
differed significantly between the four countries, with Kenya and South Africa por-
traying the most positive picture. In addition, the results indicate that the majority of 
the interventions are focusing on the direct reduction of poverty: offering concrete 
support to people through the provision of basic needs. While many local organisa-
tions expect that these interventions will also contribute to more structural change, 
the findings of this study question this supposed transformative effect.
Keywords Ex-post evaluation · Sustainability · Private development initiatives · Aid 
architecture
Resumé
Cet article présente les résultats de la première étude de durabilité ex post parmi 93 
interventions de développement mises en œuvre entre 1990 et 2008 au Kenya, en 
Inde, en Afrique du Sud et au Ghana. Les interventions ont été menées par 42 organi-
sations locales différentes avec le soutien du même nombre de petites organisations de 
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développement néerlandaises. Nous constatons qu’un grand nombre d’interventions 
permettent encore d’atteindre les résultats et l’impact escomptés. Les résultats mon-
trent qu’il n’y a aucune différence entre les interventions qui ont eu lieu 5, 10 ou 15 
ans avant l’étude. La dépendance financière vis-à-vis des organisations partenaires 
néerlandaises reste importante. Les degrés de pérennité différaient considérablement 
entre les quatre pays, avec les résultats les plus positifs en matière de pérennité au 
Kenya et en Afrique du Sud. En outre, les résultats indiquent que la majorité des in-
terventions se concentrent sur la réduction directe de la pauvreté: elles apportent un 
soutien concret aux populations en répondant à leurs besoins de base. De nombreuses 
organisations locales s’attendent à ce que ces interventions contribuent également à 
un changement plus structurel, mais les conclusions de cette étude remettent en ques-
tion l’effet transformatif qui est sensé se produire.
Introduction
Apart from well-known multilateral and civilateral agencies such as the United 
Nations and Oxfam International and, at the bilateral level, national governments, 
a wide variety of players have started to look for opportunities to join the struggle 
against worldwide poverty and inequality (Develtere 2012; Richey and Ponte 2014; 
Schulpen et  al. 2011). For different reasons, celebrities, private foundations, and 
companies have increasingly become active players in the field of international aid 
(Bishop and Green 2008; Cameron and Haanstra 2008; Develtere 2012; Develtere 
and De Bruyn 2009; Kinsbergen 2014; Richey and Ponte 2014; Samman et al. 2009; 
Yrjölä 2009).
Increasingly these new development actors become a subject of academic 
research. Interestingly, and indicative of their position in the field of international 
development, an omnipresent alternative actor in many northern countries remains 
largely untouched: the thousands of ordinary individuals who actively engage in 
the fight against poverty by starting their own small-scale, voluntary development 
organisation, independent of direct government support. Whereas other unusual sus-
pects are increasingly being recognised as actors of significance both by practition-
ers and academics (see Richey and Ponte 2014), such ‘ordinary citizens’ are still 
underexposed in academia.
In order to partly close this knowledge gap, the present study focuses on the work 
of these citizens in the field of international aid by zooming in on the sustainabil-
ity of their development interventions. From here on, we refer to them as private 
development initiatives (PDIs), defined as a group of people who offer direct and 
structural support to development interventions in one or more developing coun-
tries. What distinguishes PDIs from most of the established development actors 
is their small scale (i.e. annual budget and number of staff, with staff referring to 
both volunteers and paid staff members) and voluntary character (Kinsbergen 2014). 
Although PDIs are not unique to the Dutch context, the empirical part of this study 
focuses on development initiatives of Dutch PDIs and their local counterparts (Appe 
and Oreg 2019; Fechter and Schwittay 2019; Haaland and Wallevik 2017; Schnable 
2015; Schulpen and Huyse 2017).
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This study aims first of all to provide systematic insight into the sustainability of 
the development interventions of PDIs and, secondly, to look for determinants of 
interventions’ sustainability. We start our investigation by providing a brief back-
ground sketch of Dutch PDIs and mainly by arguing why it is worthwhile to take 
a closer look at their work and particularly the sustainability of their work. In the 
second part, we move to our understanding and operationalisation of sustainability 
and our data collection and methodology. We consequently present our findings fol-
lowing the distinction made between the lifetime and structural change dimensions 
of sustainability. In the subsequent discussion section, we start by explaining the 
limitations of the study and continue by comparing the findings with respect to sus-
tainability of PDIs to other aid actors. We conclude by providing a brief overview of 
our findings and by discussing why PDIs and NGOs are in some ways comparable 
but also quite different.
Analytical Starting Points on PDIs and Sustainability
PDIs in a Nutshell
A study of nearly 900 Dutch PDIs (CIDIN PDI Database 2008–2009) shows them 
to be run by, on average, four volunteers, and to spend about 50,000 euro per year 
on development interventions worldwide, with a geographical concentration on 
the African (e.g. Kenya, Ghana, Uganda) and Asian (e.g. Indonesia, India, Nepal) 
continents. The majority of Dutch PDIs are founded and/or run by senior citizens 
(55  years of age and above) and established mostly as a result of interest piqued 
by a journey or longer stay in a developing country. Most of the PDIs are run com-
pletely on a voluntary basis. On average, PDI volunteers spend 37 h per month in 
their organisation (Kinsbergen 2014). As such, PDI volunteers spend nearly double 
the number of hours compared to volunteers in general in the Netherlands (Schuyt 
and Gouwenberg 2009; Van Herten 2009; Van Ingen and Dekker 2011). For the 
largest part of their budget, PDIs depend on donations from private donors found 
within their own networks, such as friends, family, or colleagues. In addition, many 
of them receive donations from institutional donors that co-finance interventions of 
PDIs (see Kinsbergen and Schulpen (2011) for a more elaborate background sketch).
We argue that PDIs are part of the development aid architecture and that they are 
thus susceptible to the same need for scrutiny of their work that befalls the bigger 
and more established bilateral and multilateral players and NGOs not only because 
PDIs are ‘by nature’ active in the field of development and development cooperation 
but also because some of the Dutch PDIs explicitly consider themselves to be actors 
in the field of international development and also want to be recognised as such.
Besides, PDIs may be small and voluntary but that does not mean that establish-
ing and running a PDI is anecdotal; they are real and omnipresent. For the Nether-
lands, (debatable) estimates of their numbers range from 6400 to 15,000 PDIs. In 
2014, 4% of the Dutch (adult) population was said to be actively involved in a PDI, 
which comes down to half a million participants (Plaisier and Schulpen 2014). In 
2015, PDIs received contributions of about 47 million euro from Dutch households 
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(Bekkers et al. 2017). In Flanders (northern part of Belgium), estimates on the num-
ber of PDIs vary from 1000 to 1300. The total budget of Flemish PDIs comprises 
about 63 million euros (Mevis 2016). In the United Kingdom, also, PDIs turn out 
to be a pervasive phenomenon. Whereas in England and Wales there were around 
2,300 internationally operating charities with a budget up to 100,000 lb in 1995, this 
number rose to over 10,000 in 2014, of which nearly half had a budget of £10,000 
(Clifford 2016). A European mapping in 17 countries concludes that although dif-
ferently named and in different quantities, PDIs are common and widespread across 
Europe (Pollet et al. 2014).
But this ‘do-it-yourself’ type of development organisation is not limited to the 
European context. Of the more than 11,000 registered American relief and develop-
ment organisations, nearly 60% (6600) have an annual budget smaller than $25,000 
and hence are presumably run exclusively by volunteers or at least ‘bear heavy bur-
dens of voluntary labour’ (Schnable 2015). In line with these numbers, Richey and 
Ponte (2014) point out that underexposure of these alternative actors in academia is 
especially critical considering the growing share of private aid flows in the total of 
development assistance. There is increasing importance for privately funded aid as 
offered by PDIs since traditional sources and therefore traditional organisations are 
more and more under stress (Richey and Ponte 2014).
Potentially this entails an imminent and dramatic reshuffling of the development 
arena, which historically has been dominated by a selective group of development 
actors, here referred to as the development establishment. Considering that NGOs, 
as part of this establishment, still play a part ‘but no longer form the central theme 
of development’ (Banks and Hulme 2012, p. 25) means that getting to know new 
and emerging (unusual) players becomes increasingly pressing.
PDIs often perceive themselves to be different from other players in the field of 
development cooperation, and they are often perceived as different by more estab-
lished players precisely because of their small scale and voluntary character. Seen in 
a more negative manner, PDIs are often viewed by established development actors 
as amateurs. PDIs in turn view themselves as making an efficient and effective con-
tribution to poverty reduction and, perhaps even more importantly, as organisations 
restoring the ‘human face’ of international development cooperation (Brok and Bou-
zoubaa 2005; Develtere and De Bruyn 2009). Convinced as they are that they are 
close to the local people and are able to reach the poor, they also expect to contrib-
ute to poverty reduction and even to be able to tackle the underlying causes of pov-
erty (Brok and Bouzoubaa 2005).
This self-image is countered by critics doubting PDIs’ professionalism. Koch 
(2007), for instance, expects them to suffer from the same pitfalls as the established 
development actors have. ‘They see PDIs supporting orphanages without orphans, 
building schools without thinking of the teachers’ salaries or constructing wells that 
no local person is able to maintain. And they are seen as doing all this in a top-
down, paternalistic manner. Their contribution to poverty reduction is then by coin-
cidence at best and non-existing at worst’ (Kinsbergen et al. 2017, p. 224). Critical 
views have been expressed in several studies that since 2006 have analysed devel-
opment interventions of PDIs. These studies show positive results as far as direct 
results of PDI interventions are concerned but criticise PDIs for their lack of context 
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analysis, needs assessment, and evaluation and monitoring (Chelladurai 2006; De 
Bruyn 2013; Kamara and Bakhuisen 2008; Kinsbergen 2007, 2014; Schulpen 2007). 
Combined, these critical remarks lead to questions with regard to the prospective 
sustainability of PDI interventions.
The present study delves deeper into this sustainability-question by offering 
a first-ever ex-post assessment of 93 development interventions executed by 42 
Dutch PDIs in cooperation with an equal number of local partners in four different 
countries. In doing so, the study adds to our understanding of this unusual develop-
ment actor and thereby to our understanding of an important new strand in devel-
opment cooperation and studies. It is especially these aspects, the sample size (93 
interventions), the cross-country (4 countries) character, and the timeframe covered 
(1998–2014), that make the design of the study and therewith the insights gained 
unique.
Ex‑post Sustainability
Since the 1980s, sustainability is, together with relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, 
and impact, one of the five yardsticks in the evaluation of development interventions 
(Brown 1998; OECD 1989). However, till today conducting ex-post evaluations, 
also referred to as post-closure or ex-post facto evaluations, is still not common 
(Napier and Hayman 2016). Most evaluations assess the sustainability of develop-
ment interventions ex ante: they analyse to what extent development interventions 
meet preconditions for sustainability (Kinsbergen et al. 2017).
In a review of monitoring and evaluation experiences of development projects by 
major donor agencies in the 1970s, Binnendijk (1989, p. 210) described how efforts 
to evaluate longer-term results were often not completed since they exceeded the 
funding lifespan of the project. Ten years later, Stockmann (1997, p. 1768), while 
recognising that several ex-post evaluations had taken place, depicted how many 
evaluation studies still only ‘simply compile conjectures about the future sustain-
ability of projects and programs’. Another decade later, Intrac comes to a similar 
conclusion stating that ‘few organisations are actually doing post-closure evalua-
tions and there has been little shared information or learning to date’ (Napier and 
Hayman 2016).
Both in ex-post as ex-ante evaluations, two approaches towards sustainability can 
be distinguished. The first (widely adopted) approach offers a more formal definition 
and focuses on sustainability in terms of the lifetime of projects, programmes, or 
institutions. The relevant question is: do these projects, programmes, or organisa-
tions continue to exist after the withdrawal of external donor support (Brown 1998; 
DAC n.d.; Finsterbusch and Van Wicklin 1989)? Development projects or pro-
grammes are considered sustainable when they are able to deliver an appropriate 
level of benefits for an extended time period after major financial, managerial, and 
technical assistance from external donors is withdrawn (OECD 1989, p. 13).
Others see this formal approach as too narrow (Dietz and Zanen 2008; Edwards 
1999; Fowler 2000; Stockmann 1997; Wilkinson-Maposa and Fowler 2009). As 
Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith (1992, p. 371) state, ‘just because a project, programme 
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or organization endures, does not necessarily mean it is valuable’. The main concern 
should not be whether the project, programme, or organisation will last, but whether 
it makes a lasting impact on poverty (Edwards 1999). This second approach pro-
vides a more substantive analysis, with a strong focus on the extent to which inter-
ventions are aiming at fundamentally tackling structurally constraining factors that 
induce, maintain, or strengthen poverty and inequality (Edwards 1999; Fowler 2000; 
Stockmann 1997; Wilkinson-Maposa and Fowler 2009).
The distinction between these two approaches aligns with the division between 
Big D/little d development and the corresponding roles of development organisa-
tions (Banks and Hulme 2012; Banks et  al. 2015; Hart 2001, 2010; Mitlin et  al. 
2007). As Lewis describes, although the origin of the ‘D/d’ distinction is found in 
historical analyses of development, it has also been applied by development scholars 
in several ways that go beyond this (2019, p. 1962). In this contribution, we follow 
Banks and Hulme (2012) in distinguishing between two different roles (service pro-
viders and advocates) of civil society organisations and link service delivery to Big 
D development and advocacy to little d development. In effect, the first sustainabil-
ity approach assesses the extent to which development organisations are successful 
in their role as service providers (Big D development) in the long run; the second 
approach analyses the civil society function of development organisations and their 
contribution to long-term structural change (little d development).
In this study, we will combine both sustainability approaches. We analyse the sus-
tainability of a development intervention by assessing first the extent to which the 
intervention continued to deliver benefits over an extended period, without external 
financial and technical support; we will refer to this as the lifetime of an interven-
tion. The lifetime dimension of sustainability is assessed through three subquestions:
1. To what extent do the interventions of PDIs produce intended results in the long 
term at the level of output?
2. To what extent do the interventions of PDIs produce intended results in the long 
term at the level of outcome?
3. To what extent are output and outcome results achieved independently of the 
initial donor?
Second, we consider the extent to which an intervention aims to address and change 
the underlying causes of poverty; we will refer to this as structural change. By doing 
so, we will evaluate the role of PDIs as contributors to Big D and little d devel-
opment and analyse to what extent interventions of PDIs contribute to sustainable 
development. The structural change dimension of sustainability is determined by 
asking:
4. To what extent do the interventions of PDIs contribute to structural change?
In classifying the intervention types of PDIs in light of this second dimension, we 
start from Korten’s (1990) four generations of strategies: (1) first generation, relief 
and welfare, are aimed at alleviating directly observable needs by service delivery; 
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(2) second generation, community development, pursues the strengthening of local 
capacities of people to better meet their own needs; (3) third generation, sustainable 
system development, with a focus on the elimination of institutional and policy con-
straints; and (4) fourth generation, people’s movement, characterised by a vision of 
people-centred development with development organisations being facilitators of a 
global people’s movement.
The following example explains how the sustainability of the interventions will 
be evaluated. In 1998, a day-care centre was built to provide shelter and education 
for 75 street children between 4 and 18 years old. To assess the first sustainability 
dimension, the lifetime, we verify whether planned direct results of the intervention 
are still in place (output) and whether the planned objectives of the intervention are 
still reached (outcome). In this example, the questions are as follows:
Output: Is the centre still in place and in such a condition that it can be used for 
its intended purpose?
Outcome: Is the centre being used to provide shelter and education for the target 
group as planned?
Independence: Is the centre operating independently of the donor in management 
and financial terms?
The second dimension questions whether the intervention is aimed at targeting 
the root causes of the problem initially targeted. The question reads:
Is the centre mainly focused on taking care of those already in need by providing 
basic needs, or is the centre also running activities to prevent children from living 
in the streets?
Data and Methodology
This article is based on an analysis of 93 development interventions.1 Those inter-
ventions were run by 42 local organisations and supported by an equal number of 
Dutch PDIs. This means that some local organisations were running numerous pro-
jects (e.g. primary school and kindergarten) or subprojects (e.g. construction of four 
classrooms followed by construction of a boys’ dormitory), and some PDIs were 
involved as a donor in several interventions. These interventions were co-financed 
by the Dutch development organisation ‘Stichting Wilde Ganzen’ (from here on 
referred to as Wilde Ganzen). Founded in 1957, the organisation started to support 
small-scale development interventions implemented by Dutch PDIs and their local 
partners since the mid-nineties.
Four countries were selected for the research based on their relative importance 
with regard to the number of interventions supported by Wilde Ganzen in the past 
1 We use the term intervention to refer to the actual project being implemented, for example, the build-
ing of 4 classrooms.
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and present (and expectedly, the future): Kenya, India, South Africa, and Ghana. For 
India, the same sample of 10 interventions and partners that participated in an ear-
lier study on PDIs participated in the current study (Kinsbergen 2007). For Kenya, 
Ghana, and South Africa, the selection started with a dataset of all interventions 
supported by Wilde Ganzen in the past: Kenya (292 interventions), South Africa 
(235), and Ghana (317).
The sampling procedure consisted of two phases. In the first phase, we applied 
a stratified sampling procedure based on the age of the intervention. This allowed 
us to see if and how the age of an intervention was affecting the sustainability of 
the intervention. With ‘age’ we refer to the number of years between the financial 
investment and implementation of the intervention (e.g. when the classrooms were 
being built) and the year the study took place (2014). Three broad age groups were 
defined: interventions with an age of about 5  years, 10  years, and 15  years were 
selected to participate. In addition, a small number of older interventions were 
included. From each of these age groups, interventions were selected randomly (for 
example, every third intervention). This resulted in a gross selection of 30 interven-
tions in Kenya, 34 in South Africa, and 41 in Ghana.
In the second phase of the selection procedure, we selected the interventions to 
be included in the study. We considered the thematic focus of the interventions (e.g. 
education, health care), the type of intervention (e.g. orphanage, school building, 
hospital renovation), the budget (small versus large), and the type of partner (e.g. 
CBO, local NGO, school). By doing so, we ended with a heterogeneous sample of 
93 interventions that reflected the variety of interventions and partners of PDIs. This 
sample allowed us as well to look for possible factors affecting the sustainability of 
the intervention. Table 1 presents the final sample for the four countries. See Appen-
dix 1 for a detailed overview of the studied interventions.
The oldest intervention was implemented in 1990, the youngest in 2008. The aver-
age age of the selected interventions was 10 years. The average project budget was 
about 39,500 euros. The age of the local organisations in charge of the interventions 
varied from six to 52 years, with an average age of 22 years. All but three of the 42 
selected partner organisations still existed at the time that the study took place, com-
pared to 29 of the 42 PDIs. Twenty-two PDIs and local partners were still in coop-
eration. In these cases, the PDIs were either still supporting the intervention central 
to the study or started supporting new interventions of their local partner after that 
time. Figure 1 presents the thematic focus of the studied interventions. Forty-one of 




Budget of studied 
interventions (€)
Kenya 15 24 1,080,083
India 10 30 1,033,132
South Africa 9 22 1,099,370
Ghana 8 17 434,587
Total 42 93 3,647,172
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the interventions (43%) were aimed at improvements in the field of education (e.g. 
building classrooms or school buildings, furnishing a library). ‘Care and welfare’ 
type interventions (30%) formed the second largest group (e.g. renovating a play 
garden for a day-care centre, constructing a home for people with a disability), fol-
lowed by 16 (6%) health-care interventions (e.g. constructing a clinic). There were a 
smaller number of interventions in the areas of water, employment, and agriculture. 
Three were income-generating interventions aiming to cover the running costs of an 
organisation or its interventions. The share of the different themes within the sample 
was in accordance with the results of earlier PDI studies and can therefore be con-
sidered representative (Kinsbergen and Schulpen 2011).
Data Collection and Analysis
During the first phase of the study, for each of the interventions, planned results as 
formulated at the start were traced back. This was done through a desk study based 
on available paper records and the digital project database of Wilde Ganzen and 
websites of PDIs and local partners when available. At Wilde Ganzen, paper records 
were only available for interventions supported since 2008. For each of the interven-
tions and organisations, the background and origins of the intervention, the stake-
holders involved, the planned output and outcome, and characteristics of the PDI 
and local partners involved were mapped. The planned output and outcome results 
as agreed upon were retrieved from the project database of Wilde Ganzen. It was 
against this light that the functioning and the results of the intervention as estab-
lished during the field visit were analysed. For India, data from the Wilde Ganzen 
database were added to data collected during a field research in 2007 (Kinsbergen 
2007).















Fig. 1  Thematic focus
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During the analysis, both the principal investigator and a research assistant indepen-
dently scored the interventions along the line of the two sustainability dimensions as 
discussed in Sect. 2.2. Based on the findings, for the output and outcome results, the 
interventions were divided into four groups: (1) output results were no longer being 
achieved, (2) output results were below expectations, (3) output results were reached as 
intended, and (4) output results exceeded expectations. For the financial independence, 
we distinguished interventions that were (1) dependent on one PDI, (2) dependent on 
several foreign donors, (3) dependent on both national and foreign donors and, finally, 
(4) those that ran in a self-sufficient manner. For the second dimension, the interven-
tions were grouped in one of the four generation strategies of Korten (see above).
During the second phase of the study—the field research—the local partners formed 
the key source of information. During one- to two-day project visits, semi-structured 
(retrospective) interviews, based on an interview guide, were held with founders, man-
agers, school heads, teachers, nurses, and as much as possible with actual and former 
beneficiaries of the projects. Field research with two partners (one in Kenya and one 
in India) was not possible, but these have been included based on written sources and 
discussions with key informants outside of the two partners. Anonymous processing of 
data was guaranteed to all respondents, meaning that no names or specific information 
that might allow for a clear link to existing organisations and interventions have been 
included in this article.
These data allow for assessing the sustainability of each intervention alongside the 
two-dimensional sustainability approach. Subsequently we looked for determinants of 
interventions’ sustainability: which factors determine the sustainability of the interven-
tions? Building on Kinsbergen (2014), we analysed first of all how characteristics of 
the interventions and of the local partner organisations relate to the sustainability of the 
interventions:
 (i) characteristics of the intervention: do age, budget, theme, or type of interven-
tion correlate with sustainability?
 (ii) features of the local partner organisation: do the experience of the organisation 
(measured by age) or the type of organisation (e.g. local institution such as 
a school, or religious institution such as a congregation of sisters) influence 
sustainability?
Although it is not the main aim of this study to compare the results of the four coun-
tries, in a more exploratory manner, we do evaluate whether the context wherein the 
interventions are embedded are an influence on the sustainability results.
 (iii) Context: does the location of the intervention (measured at country level) 
relate to the sustainability of the interventions?
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Results
The Lifetime Dimension of Sustainability: Strong Results
The analysis of the interventions began with studying the current state of the 
intended output results—the direct results of an intervention. For each of the 
93 interventions studied, it was observed and discussed during the project visit 
whether the planned output was still in place. Figure 2 presents the output results 
combined for the four countries in percentages.
We found that in 75% of all the interventions, the planned output results were 
achieved and still in place. In some cases, these were infrastructural interventions 
with a lifespan of more than 10 or 15 years. The boarding school mentioned in 
the methodology section was reconstructed in 1990. Today the school is still up 
and running, and the buildings are well maintained. In a small number of cases 
(n = 3), output results even surpassed the expectations. In 22% of cases, the out-
put results were no longer there or deviated significantly from the planned results. 
For example, whereas one intervention planned to have six soup kitchens distrib-
uting soup to those in need, today only two are still in place. Table 2 presents the 
output results at the country level, both in absolute numbers and in percentages.
Kenya had the largest share of interventions that were no longer functioning 
(17%) or whose output results deviated negatively and significantly from the 
intended results (25%). India, followed by South Africa, had the highest success 
rate according to output level; 97% and 86.5%, respectively, of planned output 
results were still met or even exceeded expectations. In Ghana, the current output 





no longer reached (1) below expectations (2)
 as intended (3) exceed expectations (4)
Fig. 2  Output results 2014
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The results of the previous section indicate that in a large majority of the cases, 
planned hardware investments were still in place. In this section, we focus on the 
outcome or the usage of the hardware: there is a school building, but is schooling 
taking place? In a similar manner as for the output results, planned outcome results 
were compared with the current outcome. Figure 3 presents the total results.
In nearly 80% of the cases, planned output results were still being met or even 
went beyond expectations; for the outcome results, this accounted for 69% of the 
studied interventions. This was, for example, the case with a secondary school. In 
2004, the PDI supported the school with the construction of a school hostel. The 
school aimed to provide education for 300 children. In 2014, the school had a 
regional function and was still up and running, with more than 600 children attend-
ing classes and without overcrowding taking place. Nearly 20% of the interventions 
no longer reached the once-intended project goals. One of these interventions was 








As intended Exceed 
expecta-
tions
Kenya 4 6 14 0
17% 25% 58% 0%
India 1 0 28 1
3% 0% 93.5% 3.5%
South Africa 1 2 19 0
4.5% 9% 86.5% 0%
Ghana 0 6 9 2





no longer reached (1) below expectations (2)
as intended (3) exceed expectations (4)
Fig. 3  Outcome results 2014
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an internet café, constructed and equipped in 2007. The infrastructure was still there, 
but after 2012 it was no longer being used. Table  3 presents the country-specific 
results of the outcome analysis, both in absolute numbers and percentages.
Ghana had the highest share of interventions that did not meet the objectives as 
planned (47%). India (90%), followed by South Africa (59%), had the highest num-
ber of interventions that were still functioning as originally intentioned.
When adding up the output and outcome results, we first of all found that in 
nearly 65% of the cases (N = 60) both the planned output and outcome results as 
once planned were still being achieved at the time of the study. In the discussion sec-
tion, we will shed light on the comparability of these findings to other sectors. The 
aggregated output and outcome results show as well that in 13 cases (8%), output 
results were still there as intended, but project goals were no longer being reached or 
were below expectations. This means that the constructed hardware (e.g. clinic) was 
still in place; however, it was not being used or was used in a way that significantly 
deviated from the original plan. South Africa had the largest number of interven-
tions with output results being in place but not being used as intended. There were 
19 interventions (20%) implemented by 14 different local partners where both out-
put and outcome results were no longer being achieved or were below expectations. 
Ten of these interventions were in Kenya, six in Ghana, two in South Africa, and 
one in India.
Long‑Lasting Dependency
The first dimension of the sustainability approach considered the lifetime of out-
put and outcome results. The question, however, was not only whether output and 
outcome results were achieved in the long run but also whether these results were 
achieved independently of the initial donor. We consider here successively both the 
managerial and financial independence of local organisations and interventions.
In nine of the 42 local organisations, there was a foreigner, in most cases a 
representative of the Dutch PDI, (semi-) permanently present in the organisation. 










Kenya 7 5 11 1
29% 21% 46% 4%
India 3 0 27 0
10% 0% 90% 0%
South Africa 3 6 12 1
14% 27% 55% 4%
Ghana 5 3 6 3
29% 18% 35% 18%
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In six of these cases, these persons were actually in charge of the management 
of the organisation and its interventions. Local staff members supported them in 
their work. When asked what he would do if the Dutch director were to leave 
the organisation and therewith the development interventions, one local manager 
answered:
I would find a Dutch successor as soon as possible. (Interview with manager of 
a local organisation).
Three local organisations and their interventions were co-managed by foreigners 
together with local staff members. In three other cases, Dutch PDIs were running 
the organisation from a distance. Although in these cases there were no represent-
atives of the PDI permanently physically present, they did exert a strong influence 
from the Netherlands. The local staff were mainly the implementers of the plans 
designed in the Netherlands. In 29 of the 42 local organisations, these local staff 
members could be considered the actual managers of the interventions.
Table 4 presents the financial situation of the interventions studied (in abso-
lute numbers). At the time of the study, the functioning of 31 (33%) of the 93 
interventions was still totally dependent on the financial input of one Dutch PDI. 
Nine interventions (10%) were managed with funds from several foreign donors, 
with or without their own contributions (e.g. from income-generating activities). 
Forty-one interventions (44%) had been able to diversify their donor portfolio 
further and also receive donations from several local donors. Twelve interven-
tions (13%) could be considered self-sustaining, with most of them generating 
adequate income from the paid services they delivered.
In all nine cases where foreigners were physically present, the influx of dona-
tions was strongly dependent on their efforts; people continued to donate thanks 
to their physical presence and active role in managing the interventions and 
the trust that this engendered with the donors. One of these Dutch managers 
explained:
Some of our main donors said they would cease to donate when I leave the 
organisation. (Interview with Dutch manager of a local organisation).
Table 4  Financial situation of the interventions
The intervention is
Depend-





Dependent on both 
national and foreign 
donors
Self-sufficient
Kenya 15 1 4 4
India 3 1 24 2
South Africa 1 7 9 5
Ghana 12 0 4 1
Total 31 9 41 12 93 interventions
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It was often these foreigners, who were in contact with donors (writing proposals, 
newsletters, answering e-mails) and who were the trustworthy face of the organisa-
tion, that convinced donors to entrust their money to the organisation. Their role 
also limited local staff members in developing certain skills (fundraising, communi-
cation) and limited donors in building trust in the local organisation and staff.
Nearly 40% of interventions achieving output and outcome results as intended 
or beyond expectations were financially completely dependent on one Dutch PDI 
or several foreign donors. In addition, in one out of five of these interventions, the 
management of the organisation in charge was not locally owned but in the hands of 
a foreigner, either physically present or an organisation at a distance. These results 
indicate that some of the successful results at an output and outcome level were 
there (partly) by the grace of the financial or managerial support of foreigners. More 
precisely, although the data do not allow us to say that these interventions would no 
longer have been there without the presence of these foreign managers or the sup-
port of these donors, there are strong indications that survival in the current state 
would have been challenging.
Structural Change: The Ripple Effect?
The second dimension of our sustainability approach questioned the extent to which 
interventions were contributing to structural change. We therefore studied the 
type of interventions local partners undertook and the longer-term effects of these 
interventions.
We found that all PDIs and local organisations started off responding to direct, 
observable needs or problems by implementing interventions around service deliv-
ery. The initial strategy undertaken by PDIs and their local counterparts can hence 
be typified as direct poverty reduction or first-generation type interventions (Korten 
1987). Except for two of these, over time all of them continued to hold on to this 
strategy. Only two local partners transformed such a one-sided approach into a more 
comprehensive approach by including development strategies deliberately aimed 
at changing the structures and mechanisms in place that cause the problems they 
were trying to solve. They extended their strategy from direct poverty reduction with 
second-generation (community building) and third-generation strategies (sustainable 
system development) (Korten 1990).
Because of the above, it is to be expected that the majority of the interventions 
mainly changed individual or family lives. However, some local partners (and 
with them the PDIs) claimed to make a change that exceeds the life of one indi-
vidual, as they expect to bring about broader, structural change. Many incorporated 
these broader results into their project goals. For example, by starting a school in a 
secluded area, one of the local organisations and the PDI involved expect to improve 
the life of the community as follows:
Building a school =  > increased level of education =  > increased job oppor-
tunity =  > increased income =  > increased living standard =  > increased 
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school attendance of next generations =  > increased educated middle 
class =  > decreased corruption =  > …
Although this sounds plausible to a certain extent, the interventions these local 
organisations undertook were mostly limited to the first step of this cycle of 
change: addressing immediate needs by initiating service delivery-type projects. 
For most PDIs and their local partners, the underlying assumption was that this 
initial boost would initiate an upward spiral that followed a natural pathway, 
changing individual lives and also structures and systems at the meso (commu-
nities, regions) and even macro (national) levels. PDIs and their local partners 
have a strong belief in a ripple effect: their actual intervention is the water drop 
(e.g. the school building), and the ripples derived from this drop are the assumed, 
broader, more structural changes caused by this drop (e.g. increased job opportu-
nity). Based on the results of the study and in line with Banks and Hulme (2012), 
we question this supposition. Providing basic needs does not automatically result 
in social change. Said differently, Big D development is not a warranty for little d 
development, and little d development is not a by-product of Big D development 
interventions.
Although the data for this study do not allow us to exclude any form of social 
transformation ignited by the studied interventions, there are several reasons to mod-
erate expectations related to this. First, many PDIs and their partners support the 
same types of beneficiaries (e.g. street children) in a similar manner (e.g. shelter) 
over many years; this is indicative of the perseverance of certain problems and dem-
onstrates that tackling the root causes of a problem requires different types of inter-
ventions. The persistence of symptoms over time proves their institutionalisation 
within social and political norms and problems (Hickey and Bracking 2005).
One of the studied interventions clearly indicates that it is not a matter of course 
that through interventions aimed at direct poverty reduction, broader and more 
structural change will take place. In 2003, a local Indian organisation implemented, 
with the support of a Dutch PDI, an intervention aimed at the reintegration of child 
labourers into formal education through a ‘cow project’. To compensate for income 
loss, parents participating in the project received a cow for each child they sent back 
to school. The project aimed to provide children with an education, allowing them 
in the longer run to find proper jobs and income to take care of their future families. 
During an informal community meeting, we talked to some of the former beneficiar-
ies, mostly women. Most of them were in their early twenties, starting or already 
running their own family. By their account, their lives were comparable to those of 
their own mothers 10 years ago. Many of them were involved in low-paying home 
industries, such as the cigarette-rolling industry (‘beedie’), and others had left home 
to work in the textile industry; both are known to be extremely exploitative, low-
paying industries. Child labour was still present in the village. They expressed the 
hope of finding a ‘proper’ job, for example as a nurse, but the required higher educa-
tion was lacking, and suitable job opportunities were scarce. Although the project 
enabled them at the time to finish school, persistently restrictive structures and sys-
tems in their living environment prevented them from changing their living condi-
tions more radically, which had been an overall aim of the project (Tables 5, 6, 7, 8). 
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Second, although a large majority of the local partners are aware of the mecha-
nisms in place that result in poverty and exclusion, their interventions do not result 
from a strategy that explicitly includes and responds to these mechanisms. Almost 
all partners can formulate what could be referred to as a theory of change (ToC); 
a clear long-term vision defining the change they are pursuing and an elaboration 
of the strategy on how to realise this vision. In their daily practice however, their 
strategy is aimed at keeping their project running. Most of the time and energy of 
local partners is hence invested in maintaining or extending the actual project, as 
illustrated in the following example:
there are disabled children in need of care =  > we are taking care of them by 
building a home and arranging education =  > our main task is taking good care 
of the children by, among other things, looking for funds to provide for shelter, 
food, clothing, and education.
When these local organisations cooperate, for example, with the local government, 
it is mainly to convince the government to (financially) support their intervention. 
Support for the assumed trickle-up effect from Big D development to little d devel-
opment is missing because of a lack of or very limited monitoring and evaluation by 
PDIs and their partners. Although many of them formulate project goals that include 
structural change, a large majority do not evaluate the intervention at that level. 
Consequently, they are not able to make statements on their actual contribution to 
social change, nor can they alter their strategy based on insights gained through the 
evaluation. Almost none of the PDI partners could go beyond ‘hearsay’ stories to 
explain what happened over time to the beneficiaries still participating in the inter-
vention (e.g. increase in income) or to those who have left the intervention (e.g. job 
prospects).
Determinants of the Results: Significant Differences Between Countries
To understand the differences in terms of sustainability among the different inter-
ventions, we performed several analyses looking for determinants of the sustainabil-
ity. Both output and outcome results and independence at the level of finance and 
management were included in the study. Since variation in the second dimension 
of sustainability (structural change) was too small, we did not conduct tests at that 
level. We first of all analysed whether characteristics of the intervention affect the 
output and outcome results. To determine this, we tested correlations between the 
output and outcome results and several background characteristics of the interven-
tions (age, budget, theme, and type of intervention) and of the local organisations 
(age and type of organisation). We especially expected the age of the intervention to 
be a negative influence on its sustainability. Interestingly enough, our study does not 
find such an effect: compared to younger interventions, older interventions do not 
have a higher probability of no longer achieving the intended output and outcome 
results.
Secondly, we analysed whether the sustainability results differed between the four 
countries included in this study. Although it was not the research’s main aim to study 
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inter-country differences, here the study shows very interesting results. We conducted 
several independent-samples t-tests. The results of this analysis show there are several 
significant differences between the four different countries at the level of output (see 
Table 1) and outcome (see Table 2). Overall, we can conclude that the results of the 
interventions in South Africa and India turn out to be the most sustainable, with India 
being the leading country and South Africa the runner up. Compared to the other coun-
tries, interventions in Kenya experienced the most challenges in terms of sustainability. 
A smaller number of interventions still achieved the intended output result at the time 
of study in Kenya compared to the studied interventions in India and compared to those 
in South Africa. Both these results were significant (Kenya versus India: t(52) = − 3.34, 
p = 0.00; Kenya versus South Africa: t(44) = − 2.06, p = 0.04). The results of Ghana 
were not significantly different compared to the other countries.
At the outcome level, a significantly lower number of interventions still achieved the 
intended outcome results in Kenya compared to interventions in India (t(52) = − 2.60, 
p = 0.01). 
Table 5  Output results M SD
Kenya 1.41 0.77
India 1.96 0.41
South Africa 1.81 0.50
Ghana 1.76 0.66
Table 6  Outcome results M SD
Kenya 1.25 0.94
India 1.80 0.61
South Africa 1.50 0.80
Ghana 1.41 1.12
Table 7  Independence: financial 
management
M SD t(df) Sig. (2-tailed)




South Africa 1.81 0.85 Kenya–South Africa
− 3.00(44)
0.04
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In Kenya, a significantly higher percentage of interventions at the time of the 
study no longer achieved the intended objectives. In addition, we found that, com-
pared to interventions in India and South Africa, interventions in Kenya and Ghana 
were to a significant extent less locally owned due to both foreign financial and man-
agement involvement.
Because of the relatively small number of interventions no longer achieving their 
intended output and outcome results (n = 19) and the large variety among these (in 
terms of age of intervention, local partner organisation, budget, and theme), compar-
ing the interventions in the different countries does not permit a statistically sound 
explanation of the differences found between the countries to be given. In addition, 
since an inter-country comparison was not the aim of this study, no specific country-
level data have been collected that could contribute to a systematic, adequate expla-
nation of the differences found between the four countries that participated in the 
study.
Looking at those interventions that no longer reached output and outcome results 
as intended, we find local government often plays an impeding role, varying from 
not living up to its promises to (financially) support the organisation in develop-
ing and running the intervention, to unexpectedly changing rules and regulations or 
changing government grant schemes. In other cases, the reasons for deviant results 
were due to developments in the intervention area. The realised output or intended 
objectives were therefore no longer adequate to respond to the changed needs of the 
population. An organisation changing its strategy from sheltering those in need to 
lobbying the government to take care of those in need turns a building once built as 
a refuge into its headquarters for its new role as lobbyist. In some cases, the cessa-
tion of development interventions was hence the result of changed insights or pro-
gress and should not be considered as a failure. Whereas in some cases the discon-
tinuity of output and outcome results could have been prevented (by, for example, 
investing in a more diversified donor portfolio or in local capacities), other cases 
illustrate the uncontrollable reality in which most local organisations operate. They 
demonstrate that not everything is foreseeable and that success is not just a matter of 
good staff, organisation, and planning.
Table 8  Independence: 
management
M SD t(df) Sig. (2-tailed)




South Africa 2.91 0.43 Kenya–South Africa
− 5.23(44)
0.00
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Discussion
Limitations of the Study
The study has some limitations related to the design of the study possibly affect-
ing the internal and external validity of the study. All interventions included in this 
study received co-funding from Wilde Ganzen. The decision to co-fund these inter-
ventions was preceded by an assessment of a project proposal submitted by the PDI 
and/or its local partner to Wilde Ganzen. Because of this, the design of the study 
could possibly result in two biases. First of all, it could limit the generalisability of 
the results of the study related to the entire population of PDI interventions to those 
not going through a similar selection procedure. It could be assumed that because of 
the assessment procedure the interventions in our sample went through, the results 
of this study shed an overly positive picture of the sustainability of PDI interven-
tions. Other co-funding organisations of PDIs use similar selection methods, so the 
bias due to being a partner of Wilde Ganzen (as opposed to other co-funding agen-
cies) is considered limited.
Secondly, over time, the project evaluation procedure of Wilde Ganzen has 
changed significantly. More precisely, the number and type of criteria applied in the 
selection procedure has changed over the years. This, together with a varying num-
ber of project applications requesting co-funding from the organisation, has resulted 
in an approval rate varying from a bit over 40% in 2002, 28% in 2004, 20% in 2006 
to 54% in 2008 (own calculations based on annual reports of Wilde Ganzen). This 
implies that not all the interventions in our sample went through a similar selection 
procedure that could possibly have affected the robustness of our results. However, 
since the age of the interventions turns out not to have affected the sustainability of 
the interventions, we do not expect this bias to have been effectuated.
Finally, the results of our study do not allow for an explanation of some of the dif-
ferences in terms of the sustainability of the interventions in the different countries. 
To overcome this limitation and enlarge our understanding in this regard, in the 
design of similar future cross-country research, contextual differences and their pos-
sible impact on the sustainability of the interventions should be more systematically 
included in the data collection. Building on the results of our study, it would be, 
for example, interesting to collect data on the relation between (local) government 
and local civil society organisation in general and government support to CSOs in 
particular.
Comparability of Findings with Sustainability Levels of Other Aid Actors
For two reasons, putting the results of this study into perspective presents some 
challenges. First of all, this is because of the small number of ex-post sustainability 
studies of development interventions taking place. Secondly, those studies that do 
take place often study different types of development actors (established NGOs or 
government aid agencies) implementing different types and sizes of interventions 
(capacity building or community building) than those of the actor and interventions 
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central to the study at hand. However, taking this into account, several similarities 
can be found between the results of this study and several other ex-post sustainabil-
ity studies.
In line with the results of our study, Stockmann (1997) and Dietz and Zanen (2008) 
also found that the commitment and active involvement of donors positively influences 
the achievement of output and outcome results. Stockmann’s study included 15 inter-
ventions in 5 Latin American countries in the field of vocational training implemented 
and funded by the German government between 1962 and 1992. All of the training 
facilities constructed still existed (output) and were still in use as such (outcome). He 
described how the high standard of facilities can be attributed to intensive follow-up 
measures by the donor. This was also confirmed by the finding that during implementa-
tion organisational structures implemented by German experts often proved to be effec-
tive only as long as these experts were on location.
The study of Rijneveld et  al. (2015), focusing on Benin, substantiates our reser-
vations regarding the expected ripple effect. They studied to what extent over time a 
geographical ripple effect, as was expected in the theory of change of the intervention 
central to the study, actually took place. They found that ‘the metaphor of a seismic epi-
centre, where the intervention has catalytic effects and continues to spread until a tip-
ping point is reached for the whole of rural Benin, does not do justice to reality’ (Rijn-
eveld et al. 2015, p. V). Although not fully comparable to the ripple effect expected by 
the PDI initiators and their local partners, our study also found that catalytic effects are 
minimal.
Although studies like the ones mentioned in the previous paragraphs allow for reflec-
tion on the results of the study at hand, it remains difficult to compare the results of this 
study with other ex-post sustainability studies, especially when these studies concern 
other development actors. However, building on previous studies on PDIs and their 
development interventions, this study does allow a broadening of our understanding of 
the additionality of PDIs as development actors. PDIs are known for the long-lasting 
personal relations between them and their local partners and, sometimes, the (intended) 
beneficiaries. Many PDIs operate for multiple years in a same location; their partners 
are often small-scale community-based organisations or local institutions (such as a 
school or a clinic), and PDI representatives make frequent visits, often resulting in them 
being well known by the community. Their interventions often take place at a village or 
community level. In their people-to-people type of partnerships and way of intervening, 
most often there are no formal contracts that include an end date for the cooperation 
(Kinsbergen et al. forthcoming). Dietz and Zanen (2008) confirmed that these types of 
‘bottom-up managed projects, with a long-term commitment, were valued most posi-
tively [by local community members]. The same applies for projects treating the popu-
lation ‘with respect’. Building and maintaining mutual trust and long-term commitment 
were considered the most valuable quality of aid-providing agencies’ (154). This might, 
partly, explain the overall long-lasting continuation of development interventions and, 
with that, the results of this study. At the same time, this also explains the long-lasting 
dependency of local partners on the PDIs. The personal character of the relations and 
the strong commitment and involvement of the PDI members make stepping back chal-
lenging (De Bruyn 2011; Kinsbergen et al. forthcoming).
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Explaining Long‑Lasting Yet Non‑transformational Interventions
We found that outputs and outcomes of interventions were not dependent on whether 
the initial investments took place 5, 10, or 15 years prior. In addition, we found that 
the commitment of the PDIs is also long-lasting. However, we also found that most 
activities were non-transformational in the sense that they contributed to little d 
development and not to big D development. How can this be explained?
First, the often-limited capacity of local organisations in terms of staff and money 
makes them invest all available resources in the day-to-day management of the inter-
vention to the best of their ability. Tasks that take up most of the local managers’ 
and staff’s time include finding adequate funding and staff to keep the project going, 
writing project reports, dealing with local government regulations, and handling 
day-to-day troubleshooting. Because of this focus, there is little time or imperative 
to invest in, for example, monitoring and evaluating the project or translating actual, 
contextual developments into an up-to-date vision, policy, or project.
Second, those PDIs and partners that want to alter or extend their intervention 
strategy from direct poverty reduction to, for example, advocacy, or those that want 
to invest in monitoring and evaluation systems for learning purposes are often con-
fronted with unwilling donors, both institutional and private. One of the local organ-
isations studied started as an organisation offering education and practical support 
to street children. While expanding its activities with advocacy work and research, 
the organisation was confronted with declining support from Western donors, ham-
pering its transformation. The impact philanthropist wants to make a difference and 
succeeds best when donating to clear-cut interventions with visible results over more 
abstract, long-term interventions (Duncan 2004).
This is not unique to PDIs and their local partners but is also a well-known chal-
lenge of established development organisations. However, adding to the complex-
ity, private donors of most PDIs are often families, friends, or colleagues. The pres-
sure to give in to their wishes, to demonstrate clear results within a fairly short time 
frame, and to preserve the organisation from failure makes the PDI more prone to 
opt for service delivery types of interventions. Kilbey (2006, p. 960) adds that small 
NGOs are especially vulnerable to what she calls ‘the erosion of values […] because 
the support and resourcing options they have are fewer’.
Not only are PDIs confronted with the wishes of their donors, but also the inner 
drive of PDI volunteers—investing on average 37 h per month in the organisation—
makes the choice for clear-cut interventions with tangible results in the short term 
more evident. This is referred to as the ‘fun factor’ (Kinsbergen 2014; Kinsbergen 
et al. 2017). Many PDI volunteers mentioned that to keep going, they needed to see 
concrete results from the time, energy, and money they invested in the interventions. 
Related to this is what Salamon (1995, p. 46) refers to as ‘philanthropic particular-
ism: the tendency […] to provide certain types of services […] based on volunteers’ 
own particular interests and preference’.
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Conclusions
In this study, we have analysed the sustainability of development interventions of 
small-scale voluntary development organisations. In doing so, we aimed to get a better 
understanding of this ‘unusual’ development actor and thereby further our understand-
ing of an important new strand in development cooperation and studies. Although it 
is difficult to put the results at the output and outcome level into perspective due to a 
lack of comparative data, these results can be considered positive. In general, the target 
group (and in some cases even those that did not belong to the original target group) 
benefitted and still benefit from the interventions. In other words, small as they are, 
the interventions can make a difference in the lives of people and can continue to do 
so long after the initial investment. We can conclude that PDIs are successful in fulfill-
ing their service delivery functions (Banks et al. 2015). This result should not be taken 
lightly, considering the character of both PDIs and their local partners.
However, these positive findings come with a catch, as many of these interventions 
are still strongly dependent on the support of one or several foreign donors. At best, this 
highlights the long-lasting relations between PDIs and their partners. At worst, it shows 
the continuing dependency of these interventions of outside support. Perhaps even 
more important is that the second dimension of ‘structural’ sustainability is especially 
at risk, with a large majority of the interventions having a unilateral focus on direct 
poverty reduction over time. Tangible development interventions are clearly preferred 
over a focus on systemic change via more activist approaches.
In looking at ‘ordinary citizens’ organising themselves to actively contribute to 
development, we find two distinguishing factors to be particularly influential on the 
intervention strategies of PDIs: first there is their strong dependence on private donors, 
and second there is their dependence on the unpaid time investment of PDI volunteers. 
Both are receptive to what could be called ‘charitable consumerism’ making the PDI 
donors and PDI volunteers want to ‘consume’ charity: they are receptive and respon-
sive to easier-to-sell problems and solutions and reluctant to support those interventions 
‘addressing the complex structural difficulties of poverty and underdevelopment that a 
genuine development alternative would promote’ (Banks and Hulme 2014, p. 190). We 
therefore think the dominance of charitable consumerism in the hearts and minds of 
those initiating and/or supporting PDIs might explain their strong focus on long-lasting 
yet non-transformational types of interventions.
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